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Abstract
We study linear production situations with an infinite number of production techniques. Such
a situation gives rise to a semi-infinite linear program. Related to this program, we introduce
primal and dual games and study relations between these games, the cores of these games and the
so-called Owen set.
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1 Introduction
Linear production (LP) situations are situations where several producers own resource bundles. They
can use these resources to produce various products via linear production techniques that are available
to all the producers. The goal of each producer is to maximize his profit, which equals the revenue
of his products at the given market prices. These situations and corresponding cooperative games
are introduced in Owen (1975). He showed that these games have a nonempty core by constructing
a core-element via a related dual linear program. Samet and Zemel (1984) study relations between
the set of all core-elements we can find in this way and the core, and the emphasis in their study is
placed on replication of players. Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse, Tijs and Engel (2000) named the set
of all the core-elements that can be found in the same way as Owen did, the ‘Owen set’ and they
give a characterization of this set. More general are situations involving the linear transformation of
products (LTP), introduced by Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000), where different producers may control
different transformation techniques and each of these techniques can have more than one output good.
LTP situations give rise to LTP games, which also have a nonempty core.
1Center for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands.
2Corresponding author. E-mail address: j.b.timmer@kub.nl. This author acknowledges financial support from the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.
3Department of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Miguel Herna´ndez University, Elche Campus, La Galia Building,
Avda. del Ferrocarril, s/n, 03202 Elche, Spain
1
A part of Fragnelli, Patrone, Sideri and Tijs (1999) is devoted to the study of semi-infinite LP
situations. These are LP situations where there is a countably infinite number of products that can be
produced. Semi-infinite LTP situations, in which there is a countably infinite number of transformation
techniques, are analyzed in Timmer, Llorca and Tijs (2000).
In this work we study relations between the Owen set and the core of semi-infinite LP and LTP
situations. For this reason, we introduce primal and dual games corresponding to the primal and dual
programs of both semi-infinite LP and LTP situations. Relations between these primal and dual games
are analyzed. Our main result is that for both semi-infinite LP and LTP situations the core of the
corresponding game is nonempty if there exists a finite upper bound for the maximal profit obtained
by the coalition of all producers.
This work is organized as follows. The sections 2 and 4 present the most relevant results of
respectively finite LP and LTP situations and their corresponding games. Semi-infinite LP and LTP
situations are introduced in the sections 3 and 5, respectively. Relations between the Owen set, the
core and the primal and dual games are investigated and we show that the core is nonempty if there
exists a finite upper bound for the maximal profit obtained by the coalition of all producers. Section
6 concludes.
2 Finite linear production situations
Finite linear production (LP) situations describe situations with a set of producers, a bundle of
resources for each producer and a set of linear production techniques that all the producers may apply.
The resources are used in the various linear production techniques to produce some products that
can be sold on the market at given market prices. We assume that there are no costs involved. The
goal of each producer is to maximize his profits. Producers are also allowed to cooperate and pool
their resources. Such a coalition of producers also maximizes its profit given the joint resources.
Cooperation pays off because the maximal profit of the group is at least as much as the sum of the
individual profits.
More formally, denote by N , R and Q respectively the finite sets of producers, resources and
products. The technology matrix A ∈ IRR×Q+ describes all the available linear production techniques
in the following way. Each production technique produces one product and you need Aij units of
resource i ∈ R to produce one unit of product j ∈ Q. The resources owned by the producers are
described by the resource matrix B ∈ IRR×N+ where producer k ∈ N owns Bik units of resource
i ∈ R. Prices are denoted by the price vector c ∈ IRQ+ \ {0}. We assume that there is a positive
quantity available of each resource, that is, for all resources i ∈ R there is a producer k such that
Bik > 0. Furthermore, if there is a product j with a positive market price, then we do not allow for
“output without input” and therefore there exists at least one resource i ∈ R with Aij > 0. Finally,
all producers are price-takers and all products can be sold on the market.
To maximize his profit, producer k needs an optimal production plan x ∈ IRQ+ that tells him how
much he should produce of each good. Not all production plans are feasible since the producer has
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to take into account his limited amount of resources. The amount of resources needed in production
plan x, Ax, should not exceed the amount of resources of producer k, Be{k}, where e{k} denotes the
kth unit vector in IRN with e{k},t = 1 if t = k and e{k},t = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, the production
plan has to be nonnegative since we are only interested in producing nonnegative quantities of the
products, and its profit equals xT c. The following linear program maximizes the profit of producer k.
max
{
xT c
∣∣∣Ax ≤ Be{k}, x ≥ 0}
Next to producing on their own, producers are allowed to cooperate. If a coalition S of producers
cooperates then they put all their resources together and so, this coalition has the resource bundleBeS
at its disposal, where eS ∈ IRN with eS,t = 1 if t ∈ S and eS,t = 0 if t /∈ S. Given this large amount
of resources, the coalition wants to maximize its profit,
PS : max
{
xT c |Ax ≤ BeS , x ≥ 0
}
,
where PS denotes the primal linear program for coalitionS. The corresponding dual problem for this
coalition,DS , is the following program.
DS : min
{
yTBeS
∣∣∣ATy ≥ c, y ≥ 0}
The vector y can be seen as a vector of shadow prices for the resources since the condition ATy ≥ c
can be interpreted as follows. If a company wants to buy the resources BeS of coalition S and is
willing to pay yj per unit of good j ∈ M then for any product j ∈ Q, the value of the resources
needed to produce one unit of this product according to the prices in y should be at least as large as
the market price cj . Otherwise, coalition S will not agree with this sale. Therefore, the program DS
minimizes the value of the resources owned by coalitionS according to the shadow prices and subject
to the restrictions above.
For ease of notation, let FpS and FdS denote the set of feasible solutions of respectively the primal
and dual program for coalition S,
FpS =
{
x ∈ IRQ |Ax ≤ BeS , x ≥ 0
}
,
FdS =
{
y ∈ IRR
∣∣∣ATy ≥ c, y ≥ 0} ,
denote by wpS and wdS the optimal values of the programs,
wpS = max
{
xT c |x ∈ FpS
}
,
wdS = min
{
yTBeS |y ∈ FdS
}
,
and let OpS and OdS be the sets of optimal solutions,
OpS =
{
x ∈ FpS
∣∣∣xT c = wpS } ,
OdS =
{
y ∈ FdS
∣∣∣yTBeS = wdS } .
The assumptions we made ensure that FpS , FdS , OpS and OdS are nonempty sets and wpS and wdS
exist and are finite. It follows from duality theory that wpS = wdS for all coalitions S.
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We see that an LP situation can be described by the tuple (N,A,B, c). Corresponding to such
a situation we define two games, (N, vp) and (N, vd). The first one, (N, vp), is the well known LP
game where vp(S) = wpS for all coalitionsS. The second game, (N, vd), is the game that gives each
coalition S the value of its dual program, vd(S) = wdS .
If two producers cooperate then they can produce at least the amount that they can produce on
their own, so, their joint profit will be at least as large as the sum of their individual profits. Similar
reasoning shows that the highest profit will be obtained if all the producers work together. But how
should this joint profit be divided among the producers? We could divide the profit according to a
so-called core-allocation. The core of a game (N, v),C(v), allocates the profit in such a way that no
coalition of producers has an incentive to start producing on their own. More precisely,
C(v) =
{
x ∈ IRN
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N
}
.
We define the core of an LP situation, Core(A,B, c), to be the core of the corresponding LP game,
Core(A,B, c) = C(vp). Owen (1975) shows that LP games are totally balanced, that is, the games
themselves have a nonempty core and so do all of their subgames. He obtains this result by showing
that we can easily obtain a core-element of an LP game as follows. Instead of solving the programs
PS for all coalitions S ⊂ N in order to calculate vp(S) and the core, we only solve DN , the dual
program of the grand coalition. Let y be an optimal solution of DN . If each producer k gets the
value of his resources according to the shadow prices, yTBe{k}, then this distribution of values is a
core-allocation. The set of all core-allocations that we can obtain in this way, is called the Owen set
corresponding to the LP situation (N,A,B, c).
Owen(A,B, c) =
{
(yTBe{k})k∈N | y ∈ OdN
}
This set has been studied extensively by Gellekom et al. (2000) and they also provide a characterization
of the Owen set. Because the set OdN is nonempty, so is Owen(A,B, c). Furthermore, each vector
in this set is an element of C(vp) and therefore Owen(A,B, c) ⊂ Core(A,B, c).
We end this section with an example of an LP situation and corresponding LP game.
Example 2.1 Consider the following LP situation. There are two producers, N = {1, 2}, two
resources, two products and
A =

 2 2
1 3

 , B =

 6 0
0 7

 , c =

 3
4

 .
Producer 1 owns nothing of the second resource (see the first column of the resource matrix B)
and producer 2 owns nothing of the first resource. Since both products require a positive amount
of input of each of the two resources, a single producer cannot produce anything. Consequently,
vp({1}) = vp({2}) = 0. If both producers cooperate then they own a positive amount of each
resource and they have many production plans at their disposal, namely all plans x ∈ FpN .
FpN = {x ∈ IR2| 2x1 + 2x2 ≤ 6, x1 + 3x2 ≤ 7, x ≥ 0}
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The profit of such a production plan x is cTx = 3x1+4x2 and so, the profit maximization problemPN
of the grand coalition equals max{3x1 + 4x2| x ∈ FpN}. The maximal profit wpN = 11 is attained
in the plan x = (1, 2)T , so OpN = {(1, 2)T}, and Core(A,B, c) = {(a, 11− a)T | 0 ≤ a ≤ 11}.
For the dual game (N, vd) it holds that vd({i}) = vp({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . The set of all feasible
shadow prices for the grand coalition is the set
FdN = {y ∈ IR2| 2y1 + y2 ≥ 3, 2y1 + 3y2 ≥ 4, y ≥ 0}.
We want to minimize the value of the resources of coalition N according to the shadow prices
y, yTBeN = 6y1 + 7y2, over all feasible shadow prices: min{6y1 + 7y2| y ∈ FdN}. The min-
imum wdN = 11 is attained in y = (5/4, 1/2)T and so OdN = {(5/4, 1/2)T}. The Owen
set, Owen(A,B, c) = {(15/2, 7/2)T}, consists of one point and we see that Owen(A,B, c) ⊂
Core(A,B, c), Owen(A,B, c) 6= Core(A,B, c). 3
3 Semi-infinite LP situations
If we extend the set Q such that it contains a countable infinite number of products then we arrive
at semi-infinite LP situations. Without loss of generality we may assume that Q = IN = {1, 2, . . .},
the set of natural numbers. An example of a production process with a countable infinite number of
products is the ‘process’ of baking pancakes at home. Pancakes are made of milk, flour, eggs, salt,
butter and perhaps a little sugar. If you have a recipe for baking pancakes and you change the amounts
of the ingredients slightly (e.g. you add a little flour or you use a little bit less milk) then you get
another recipe for pancakes. This set of processes will be countable infinite if you require that all
quantities should be integer multiples of one gram, for example.
A semi-infinite LP situation (N,A,B, c) thus has A ∈ IRR×Q+ , B ∈ IRR×N+ and c ∈ IR
Q
+ with
Q = IN. As opposed to LP situations, we impose no further restrictions on these variables. Because
we have a countable infinite number of products, the linear programs, which determine the ‘maximal’
profits of the coalitions, and their dual programs are now semi-infinite linear programs. The primal
program for a coalition S of producers that determines its maximal profit, now equals
PS : sup{x
T c|Ax ≤ BeS , x ≥ 0},
where we replaced the maximum by the supremum since the optimal value may not be reached by any
production plan x. This program contains an infinite number of variables xj , j ∈ Q. Similarly, in the
dual program
DS : inf{y
TBeS |A
Ty ≥ c, y ≥ 0}
we replaced the minimum by the infimum because we have an infinite number of restrictions. The set
of feasible dual solutions,FdS , may now be empty and the same holds for the sets of optimal solutions
OpS and OdS . The optimal values are
wpS = sup{x
T c| x ∈ FpS}
wdS = inf{y
TBeS | y ∈ FdS}.
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Once again we define two games, the LP game (N, vp) and the dual game (N, vd)where vp(S) = wpS
and vd(S) = wdS . Notice that in this setting the valueswpS andwdS may take any nonnegative number
including+∞. Several nice properties of these games are mentioned in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N,A,B, c) be a semi-infinite LP situation. Then
1. FdS = FdN for all S ⊂ N ,
2. vp and vd are monotonic games,
3. vp(S) ≤ vd(S) for all S ⊂ N .
Proof. First, by definition it holds that FdS = {y ∈ IRR|ATy ≥ c, y ≥ 0} = FdN for all S ⊂ N .
Second, let S ⊂ T ⊂ N be coalitions of agents, then a game (N, v) is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ).
Here, BeS ≤ BeT implies that FpS ⊂ FpT and so vp(S) = sup{xT c| x ∈ FpS} ≤ vp(T ). From
the first part of this proof it follows that FdS = FdT and together with BeS ≤ BeT this gives
vd(S) = inf{yTBeS |y ∈ FdS} ≤ vd(T ).
Third, let S ⊂ N be a coalition of agents. If FdS = ∅ then vp(S) ≤ ∞ = vd(S). Otherwise,
take feasible solutions x ∈ FpS and y ∈ FdS . Then xT c = cTx ≤ yTAx ≤ yTBeS and therefore
vp(S) = sup{x
T c| x ∈ FpS} ≤ inf{y
TBeS | y ∈ FdS} = vd(S). 2
We use these properties to prove the next results about the relations between the Owen set and the
cores of the LP and dual games.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N,A,B, c) be a semi-infinite LP situation. Then
1. Owen(A,B, c) ⊂ C(vd),
2. if vp(N) = vd(N) then C(vd) ⊂ C(vp).
Proof. Firstly, if Owen(A,B, c) = ∅ then we are finished. Otherwise, take an element z ∈
Owen(A,B, c). Then there exists an optimal dual solution y′ ∈ OdN such that zi = (y′)TBe{i} for
all i ∈ N . So,
∑
i∈N zi =
∑
i∈N (y
′)TBe{i} = (y
′)TBeN = vd(N) because y′ ∈ OdN . It also
holds that
∑
i∈S zi = (y
′)TBeS ≥ inf{y
TBeS | y ∈ FdS} = vd(S)where the inequality follows from
y′ ∈ FdS . We conclude that z ∈ C(vd).
Secondly, ifC(vd) = ∅ then we are finished. Otherwise take an element z ∈ C(vd). By definition
it holds that
∑
i∈N zi = vd(N) = vp(N). It also holds that
∑
i∈S zi ≥ vd(S) ≥ vp(S) where the
first inequality follows from z ∈ C(vd) and the second one from statement 3 in theorem 3.1. Hence,
z ∈ C(vp). 2
A corollary of this theorem is that if vp(N) = vd(N), there is no duality gap, then Owen(A,B, c) ⊂
Core(A,B, c). In the first part of the proof we noticed that Owen(A,B, c) = ∅ may hold. The fol-
lowing example provides a semi-infinite LP situation where this is true and where the cores of the two
games are nonempty.
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Example 3.3 Consider the semi-infinite LP situation (N,A,B, c)where N is a set of five agents,
A =

 1 1 . . . 1 . . .
1 4 . . . n2 . . .

 , BeN =

 0
1

 , and
cT =
[
2 4 . . . 2n . . .
]
.
Then
vd(N) = inf{yTBeN |ATy ≥ c, y ≥ 0}
= inf{y2| y1 + n2y2 ≥ 2n, n = 1, 2, . . . , y ≥ 0}
= 0,
FdN 6= ∅ but OdN = ∅. Consequently, Owen(A,B, c) = ∅. However, vp(N) = 0 implies that
vp(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N and therefore Core(A,B, c) = C(vp) = {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} 6= ∅. Similarly we
can show that C(vd) = {(0, 0, . . . , 0)}. 3
Two other relations between the Owen set and the core, depending on the values vp(N) and vd(N),
are presented in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Let (N,A,B, c) be a semi-infinite LP situation. Then
1. if vp(N) < vd(N) <∞ then Owen(A,B, c) ∩ Core(A,B, c) = ∅,
2. if vp(N) < vd(N) =∞ then Owen(A,B, c) = ∅ and the core Core(A,B, c) is nonempty.
Proof. Concerning the first item, if Owen(A,B, c) = ∅ then the proof is finished. Otherwise, let
z ∈ Owen(A,B, c) and take y ∈ OdN such that zi = yTBe{i} for all i ∈ N . Then
∑
i∈N zi =∑
i∈N y
TBe{i} = y
TBeN = vd(N) > vp(N). Hence, z /∈ C(vp) = Core(A,B, c).
Secondly, since BeN contains finite quantities, vd(N) = ∞ can occur only if FdN = ∅. In this
case, OdN = ∅ and therefore Owen(A,B, c) = ∅. The latter part of this statement, the nonemptiness
of Core(A,B, c), will be shown in theorem 3.6. 2
All the above relations between the Owen set and the core of a semi-infinite LP situation can be
summarized as follows.
Theorem 3.5 Let (N,A,B, c) be a semi-infinite LP situation.
• If vp(N) = vd(N) then Owen(A,B, c) ⊂ Core(A,B, c).
• If vp(N) < vd(N) then Owen(A,B, c)∩ Core(A,B, c) = ∅.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the theorems 3.2 and 3.4. 2
As we stated in the second part of the proof of theorem 3.4 there is one thing left to show, namely
that the core of a semi-infinite LP situation is nonempty whenever the ‘profit’ of the grand coalition
is finite, vp(N) <∞.
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Theorem 3.6 Let (N,A,B, c) be a semi-infinite LP situation where the corresponding LP game
(N, vp) has vp(N) <∞. Then Core(A,B, c) 6= ∅.
Proof. This proof is an exhaustive list of all possible semi-infinite LP situations that we may come
across. In each of these situationswe will show that if vp(N) is finite then Core(A,B, c) is a nonempty
set.
First, suppose that BeN = 0, where 0 denotes the vector with each element equal to zero. Thus,
all the agents have no resources available. But then no producer can produce a positive quantity
of any product, so FpS = {0} for all coalitions S and consequently vp(S) = 0. In particular,
vp(N) = 0 <∞ and Core(A,B, c) = C(vp) = {(0, . . . , 0)} 6= ∅.
What happens if BeN 6= 0 but every product needs a resource that is not available? Let h(t)
describe for all resource vectors t ∈ IRR+ those resources that are available in a positive quantity, so,
h(t) = {i ∈ R| ti > 0}. Denote by e′j the jth unit vector in IRQ with e′j,l = 1 if l = j and e′j,l = 0
otherwise. Then Ae′j is a vector in IRR+ that describes how much we need of each resource to produce
one unit of product j ∈ Q. Thus, h(BeN ) 6⊃ h(Ae′j) for all j ∈ Q means that each product j ∈ Q
needs some unavailable resources. Consequently, no producer can produce a positive quantity of
some product, FpS = {(0, 0, . . .)} and vp(S) = 0 for all coalitions S of producers. In particular,
vp(N) = 0 <∞ and Core(A,B, c) = {(0, . . . , 0)} 6= ∅.
Assume now thatBeN 6= 0 and that some products can be produced, that is,h(BeN ) ⊃ h(Ae′j) for
some j ∈ Q. All coalitions of producers want to maximize their profit and therefore they will restrict
their production to the products that can be produced. So, without changing the values of the coalitions
we remove all products j ∈ Q that cannot be produced, that is, for which h(BeN ) 6⊃ h(Ae′j), as
well as all unavailable resources i ∈ R, which have (BeN )i = 0. For simplicity of notation, let
(N,A,B, c) also denote this reduced semi-infinite LP situation.
This brings us to the next situation where BeN > 0 and consequently, h(BeN ) = M ⊃ h(Ae′j)
for all j ∈ Q. What happens if c = 0, prices are zero? If all products have a price equal to zero
then anything a producer sells on the market will give him a revenue of zero. So, vp(S) = 0 for all
coalitions S of producers and in particular it holds that vp(N) = 0 <∞ and Core(A,B, c) 6= ∅.
If BeN > 0 and there is a product j ∈ Q for which cj > 0 then we can remove all products j
for which cj = 0 without changing any of the values vp(S). This holds because each coalition of
producers will restrict its production to the products with a positive price.
This leads toBeN > 0 and c > 0. If there exists a product j ∈ Q that uses no resources,Ae′j = 0,
then the producers can produce an infinite amount of this good, because it needs no input, and sell it
at price cj > 0 to obtain an infinite profit. Hence, vp(N) =∞ and we may say that the producers are
in heaven since they can take as much of the profit as they want.
Finally, we end up with BeN > 0, c > 0 and Ae′j 6= 0 for all j ∈ Q. In this case we use a
theorem of Tijs (1979) that says that we have either vp(N) = vd(N) = ∞ (heaven once again) or
vp(N) = vd(N) < ∞. In the latter case, OdN 6= ∅ and consequently Owen(A,B, c) 6= ∅, which
implies that Core(A,B, c) 6= ∅. 2
8
We may conclude from this theorem that if vp(N) < ∞ then there exists a core-allocation, a
division of the value vp(N) upon which no coalition S can improve. If we are in the heavenly
situation vp(N) =∞, then we do not need shadow prices or core-allocations since any producer can
get what he wants from vp(N), even if it is an infinitely large amount.
4 Finite LTP situations
Another kind of linear production is described by situations involving the linear transformation of
products (LTP), where the ‘T’ stands for the transformation of a set of input goods into a set of output
goods. Thus, each transformation technique may have more than one output good. Recall that each
production process in an LP situation has only one output good, namely its product. Furthermore,
different producers may have different transformation techniques at their disposal, while in an LP
situation all producers use the same set of production techniques. LTP situations are introduced in
Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000) and defined as follows.
Let M be the finite set of goods and N the finite set of producers. Producer i ∈ N owns the
bundle of goods ω(i) ∈ IRM+ and we assume that all producers together own something of each good,
that is,
∑
i∈N ω(i) > 0. A transformation technique is described by a vector a ∈ IRM , for example
a =


5
0
1
−3


if M contains four goods. Positive elements in such a vector a indicate that the corresponding good
is an output of the transformation technique, negative elements indicate input goods and zero means
that the corresponding good is not used in this technique. In this example, the first and third good are
outputs of the transformation process, the fourth good is an input and the second good is not used.
More precisely, 3 units of the fourth good can be transformed into 5 units of the first good and 1 unit
of the third good. We assume that each transformation technique uses at least one good to produce
another good, so, it contains at least one positive and one negative element.
Denote by Di the set of transformation techniques of producer i ∈ N . Then k ∈ Di means
that producer i can use technique ak. The set of all transformation techniques is D = ∪i∈NDi. We
assume that all producers are price-takers and that all goods can be sold at the exogenous market
prices p ∈ IRM+ \ {0}. All transformation techniques are linear, so, 2ak is also a transformation
technique. The factor 2 is called the activity level of technique k. Denote by y = (yk)k∈D the
vector of activity levels. Because we cannot reverse any transformation process, all activity levels are
nonnegative. The transformation matrix A ∈ IRM×D is the matrix with transformation technique ak
at column k. Related to this is the matrix G ∈ IRM×D+ that describes which and how many of the
goods are needed as inputs in the various transformation techniques. For all j ∈ M and k ∈ D we
have Gjk = gkj = max{0,−akj}. From this it follows that (ak + gk)j = max{akj , 0}, so the vector
ak+gk describes which and how many of the goods are outputs in technique k. Thus, when technique
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k has activity level yk ≥ 0 then the vector gkyk describes the amount of input goods we need and
(ak + gk)yk describes the output of this transformation technique.
Consider first a single producer i ∈ N . He should choose his activity vector y such that the
amount of goods he needs does not exceed the amount of goods he owns, Gy ≤ ω(i). Furthermore,
this producer can only use his own transformation techniques. Therefore yk = 0 if k /∈ Di. The
amount of output of the transformation techniques will be (A+G)y. We see that the producer started
with ω(i) from which he uses Gy as inputs and he obtains (A + G)y as outputs, so he can sell the
remaining goods, ω(i)−Gy + (A+G)y = ω(i) +Ay, on the market. His goal is to maximize his
profit pT (ω(i) +Ay) such that the activity vector y is feasible:
max{pT (ω(i) +Ay)|Gy ≤ ω(i), y ≥ 0, yk = 0 if k /∈ Di}.
Producers are also allowed to work together. When they cooperate then they will pool their techniques
and their bundles of goods. A coalition S ⊂ N of producers has the bundle ω(S) =
∑
i∈S ω(i) at its
disposal and it can use all the transformation techniques inD(S) = ∪i∈SDi. The profit maximization
problem of such a coalition is similar to that of a single producer and equals
max{pT (ω(S) +Ay)|Gy ≤ ω(S), y ≥ 0, yk = 0 if k /∈ D(S)}.
When we want to determine the dual problem of this profit-maximization problem then the last
constraint, yk = 0 if k /∈ D(S), gives some trouble because it is not linear. However, we will replace
this constraint by a linear restriction with the same interpretation. For this, define for all k ∈ D and
S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅
β(S)k =

 ∞ , k ∈ D(S)0 , k /∈ D(S).
This vector β(S) gives an upper bound for the activity vector that can be chosen by coalition S and it
implies that
 yk = 0 if k /∈ D(S)y ≥ 0 ⇔

 y ≤ β(S)y ≥ 0.
The (primal) maximization problem PS for coalition S can thus be rewritten to
PS : max{p
T (ω(S) +Ay)|Gy ≤ ω(S), y ≤ β(S), y ≥ 0}.
Because of the vector β(S) it is now very easy to determine the dual program DS of PS .
DS : min

(zM + p)Tω(S) + zTDβ(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
GT zM + zD ≥ A
Tp,
zM ≥ 0, zD ≥ 0


The vectorAT p ∈ IRD denotes the profits in dollars per activity level for all transformation techniques.
The matrixG is denoted in units of goods per activity level. Therefore, the vector zM ∈ IRM is denoted
in units of dollars per good an the vector zD ∈ IRD in dollars per activity level. A nice interpretation
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for the vector zM follows from the complementary slackness conditions: if yˆ, zˆM and zˆD are optimal
solutions of the primary and dual programs of coalition S then
0 = zˆTM [ω(S)−Gyˆ] , (1)
0 = zˆTD [β(S)− yˆ] and (2)
0 = yˆT [GT zˆM + zˆD − A
Tp].
Equation (1) is equal to ∑j∈M zˆM,j(ω(S)−Gyˆ)j = 0. This sum of nonnegative elements is zero if
and only if each element equals zero. So, for all goods j ∈ M it holds that zˆM,j(ω(S)−Gyˆ)j = 0.
If zˆM,j > 0 then ω(S)j = (Gyˆ)j: the available amount of good j, is precisely enough to cover the
amount of good j that is needed. From the objective function of the dual program DS it follows
that an extra unit of good j will raise the profit by zˆM because duality theory says that the optimal
values of PS and DS are equal. If, on the other hand, the amount of good j available is too large,
ω(S)j > (Gyˆ)j , then zˆM,j = 0: an extra unit of good j will not raise the profit. We can therefore
think of zˆM as the vector of prices that the coalition S of producers is willing to pay for an extra
unit of the goods. We will call the vector zˆM + p the vector of shadow prices for the goods of this
coalition. The following theorem shows a nice result that follows from (2).
Theorem 4.1 The equality zˆTDβ(S) = 0 holds for all optimal solutions (zˆM , zˆD) of DS .
Proof. Because the set of feasible solutions of DS is closed, convex, nonempty and bounded from
below by the zero-vector, the program DS can be solved and a minimum exists. Let (zˆM , zˆD) be
an optimal solution. By the complementary slackness conditions equation (2) holds and is equal to∑
k∈D zˆD,k(β(S) − yˆ)k = 0. Again, this is a sum of nonnegative elements, so it should hold that
zˆD,k(β(S)− yˆ)k = 0 for all transformation techniques k ∈ D. If zˆD,k > 0 then β(S)k = yˆk . The
definition of β(S) implies that in this case β(S)k = 0, so k /∈ D(S). If β(S)k > yˆk , which is
equivalent to k ∈ D(S), then zˆD,k = 0. We conclude that zˆD,kβ(S)k = 0 for all transformation
techniques k ∈ D. 2
For ease of notation let FpS and FdS denote the sets of feasible solutions of respectively the primal
and the dual program for coalition S,
FpS = {y ∈ IRD|Gy ≤ ω(S), y ≤ β(S), y ≥ 0}
FdS = {(zM , zD) ∈ IRM × IRD|GT zM + zD ≥ AT p, zM ≥ 0, zD ≥ 0},
denote by upS and udS the optimal values of the programs,
upS = max{p
T (ω(S) + Ay)| y ∈ FpS}
udS = min{(zM + p)
Tω(S) + zTDβ(S)| (zM , zD) ∈ FdS},
and let OpS and OdS be the sets of optimal solutions,
OpS = {y ∈ FpS| p
T (ω(S) +Ay) = upS}
OdS = {(zM , zD) ∈ FdS | (zM + p)
Tω(S) + zTDβ(S) = udS}.
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The sets FpS , FdS , OpS and OdS are nonempty and the values upS and udS exist and are finite. By
duality theory it holds that upS = udS for any coalition S of producers.
An LTP situation will be described by the tuple (N,A,D, ω, p) where ω = (ω(i))i∈N . Corre-
sponding to an LTP situation we define two cooperative games. The first one, (N, vp), is the LTP game
as defined in Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000) where vp(S) = upS , the maximal profit that coalition S
can obtain. The second one is the dual game (N, vd) that gives each coalition S the value of its dual
program, vd(S) = udS .
The core of an LTP situation, Core(A, ω, p), is defined as the core of an LTP game, Core(A, ω, p) =
C(vp). Furthermore, we know that for all (zM , zD) ∈ OdN
vp(N) = vd(N) = (zM + p)
Tω(N) + zTDβ(N) = (zM + p)
Tω(N),
where the last equality follows from theorem 4.1. Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000) show that ((zM +
p)Tω(i))i∈N ∈ C(vp). Thus it follows from OdN 6= ∅ that LTP games are totally balanced: each
LTP game has a nonempty core and because each subgame is another LTP game, these subgames also
have a nonempty core. Although G. Owen did not show that you can find a core-element of an LTP
game via the dual program DN , we let Owen(A, ω, p) denote the set of all core-elements that we can
find in this way:
Owen(A, ω, p) = {((zM + p)Tω(i))i∈N | (zM , zD) ∈ OdN}.
FromOdN 6= ∅ it also follows that Owen(A, ω, p) 6= ∅ and by definition it holds that Owen(A, ω, p)⊂
Core(A, ω, p).
The following example of an LTP situation with its two corresponding games illustrates the
concepts introduced in this section.
Example 4.2 Consider the following LTP situation. There are two producers,N = {1, 2}, they work
with two goods in their transformation techniques and
A =

 −1 −1
2 3

 , ω(1) = ω(2) =

 1
1

 , p =

 1
1

 .
The first column of A contains the technique of producer 1 and the second column contains the
technique of the other producer, so, Di = {i}, i ∈ N . When each of the producers works on her
own then she will transform her single unit of the first good into respectively 2 and 3 units of the
second good. This producer already owns a unit of the second good and therefore vp({1}) = 3 and
vp({2}) = 4.
When the producers cooperate then they own ω(N) = (2, 2)T and their set of feasible activity
vectors is
FpN = {y ∈ IR2| y1 + y2 ≤ 2, y ≥ 0}.
Producer 2 has a more efficient transformation technique than producer 1 because it generates a larger
profit from the same amount of input, namely 2 dollars per activity level against 1 dollar per activity
level for producer 1.
PN : max{4 + y1 + 2y2| y ∈ FpN}
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The maximal profit upN = 8 is attained in y = (0, 2)T , so OpN = {(0, 2)T}. The core equals
Core(A, ω, p) = {(b, 8− b)| 3≤ b ≤ 4}.
For the dual game (N, vd) it holds that vd({1}) = 3 and vd({2}) = 3. The set of feasible solutions
of DN is
FdN = {(zM , zD) ∈ IR2+ × IR2+| zM,1+ zD,1 ≥ 1, zM,1 + zD,2 ≥ 2}.
When we solve the program DN
min{4 + 2zM,1 + 2zM,2 +∞(zD,1 + zD,2)| (zM , zD) ∈ FdN}
then we get OdN = {((2, 0), (0, 0))} and udN = 8 = upN . Thus the Owen set consists of only one
point, Owen(A, ω, p) = {(4, 4)} and is contained in Core(A, ω, p). 3
5 Semi-infinite LTP situations
In this section we will study semi-infinite LTP situations where the set D contains a countable infinite
number of transformation techniques. Without loss of generality we assume that D = {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
A semi-infinite LTP situation (N,A,D, ω, p) thus has A ∈ IRM×D, ω(i) ∈ IRM+ for all i ∈ N and
p ∈ IRM+ . As opposed to the previous section, we do not put any futher restrictions on A, ω and p.
Because of the infinite number of transformation techniques, the linear programs that determine the
maximal profits of the coalitions and their dual programs are semi-infinite linear programs. Therefore,
we will replace the maximum by the supremum in the definitions of PS and upS and the minimum
will be replaced by the infimum in the definitions of DS and udS . As opposed to finite LTP situations,
the set of feasible dual solutions FdS may now be empty and the same holds for the sets of optimal
solutionsOpS and OdS . The two games (N, vp) and (N, vd) are defined as before, so, vp(S) = upS
for the LTP game and vd(S) = udS for the dual game. In this semi-infinite situation the values upS
and udS can take any nonnegative value as well as +∞.
The Owen set, as defined in the previous section, is based on the dual program for the grand
coalition:
DN : inf

(zM + p)Tω(N) + zTDβ(N)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
GT zM + zD ≥ ATp,
zM ≥ 0, zD ≥ 0

 .
In our definition of the Owen set we use that for finite LTP situations it holds that zTDβ(N) = 0
for any optimal solution (zM , zD) of DN . But this property need not hold for semi-infinite LTP
situations. When udN = ∞ then an optimal solution (zM , zD) (if it exists) has zTDβ(N) = ∞ but
when udN <∞ then zTDβ(N) = 0. For this reason we will define the Owen set only if udN <∞:
Owen(A, ω, p) = {((zM + p)Tω(i))i∈N | (zM , zD) ∈ OdN}.
The next theorem states some nice properties of the LTP and dual games.
Theorem 5.1 Let (N,A,D, ω, p) be a semi-infinite LTP situation. Then
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1. FdS = FdN for all S ⊂ N ,
2. vp and vd are monotonic games,
3. vp(S) ≤ vd(S) for all S ⊂ N .
Proof. First, by definition FdS = {(zM , zD) ∈ IRM+ × IRD+ |GTzM + zD ≥ ATp} = FdN for all
S ⊂ N .
Second, let S ⊂ T ⊂ N , then ω(S) ≤ ω(T ) and β(S) ≤ β(T ). So, FpS = {y ∈ IRD|Gy ≤
ω(S), y ≤ β(S), y ≥ 0} ⊂ FpT and therefore vp(S) = sup{pT (ω(S) + Ay)| y ∈ FpS} ≤ vp(T ).
From the first part of this proof it follows that FdS = FdT and together with ω(S) ≤ ω(T ) and
β(S) ≤ β(T ) this implies that vd(S) = inf{(zM + p)Tω(S) + zTDβ(S)| (zM , zD) ∈ FdS} ≤ vd(T ).
Third, let S be a coalition of producers. If FdS = ∅ then vp(S) ≤ ∞ = vd(S). Otherwise, take
feasible solutions y ∈ FpS and (zM , zD) ∈ FdS . Then pT (ω(S) + Ay) = pTω(S) + yTATp ≤
pTω(S) + yT (GT zM + zD) = p
Tω(S) + zTMGy + z
T
Dy ≤ p
Tω(S) + zTMω(S) + z
T
Dβ(S) = (zM +
p)Tω(S) + zTDβ(S) and from this it follows that vp(S) = sup{pT (ω(S) + Ay)| y ∈ FpS} ≤
inf{(zM + p)Tω(S) + zTDβ(S)| (zM , zD) ∈ FdS} = vd(S). 2
Some relations between the Owen set and the cores of the LTP and dual games are stated below.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N,A,D, ω, p) be a semi-infinite LTP situation. Then the following two relations
hold.
1. If vd(N) <∞ then Owen(A, ω, p)⊂ C(vd).
2. If vp(N) = vd(N) then C(vd) ⊂ C(vp).
Proof. Firstly, if Owen(A, ω, p) = ∅ then the result holds. Otherwise, let x ∈ Owen(A, ω, p). Then
there exists a solution (z′M , z′D) ∈ OdN such that xi = (z′M + p)Tω(i) for all i ∈ N . By definition,∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N(z
′
M + p)
Tω(i) = (z′M + p)
Tω(N) = (z′M + p)
Tω(N) + (z′D)
Tβ(N) = vd(N),
where (z′D)Tβ(N) = 0 because vd(N) < ∞. Second, (z′D)Tβ(N) = 0 implies (z′D)Tβ(S) = 0
because β(N) ≥ β(S). Also, (z′M , z′D) ∈ OdN ⊂ FdN = FdS , where the last equality follows from
statement 1 of theorem 5.1. Thus, ∑i∈S xi = (z′M + p)Tω(S) = (z′M + p)Tω(S) + (z′D)Tβ(S) ≥
inf{(zM + p)Tω(S) + zTDβ(S)| (zM , zD) ∈ FdS} = vd(S). Hence, x ∈ C(vd).
Secondly, if C(vd) = ∅ then we are done. Otherwise, take an element x ∈ C(vd). By definition
it holds that
∑
i∈N xi = vd(N) = vp(N). Furthermore,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ vd(S) ≥ vp(S) by statement 3 in
theorem 5.1. We conclude that x ∈ C(vp). 2
A consequence of this theorem is that if vp(N) = vd(N) <∞ then Owen(A, ω, p) ⊂ Core(A, ω, p).
We can now have Owen(A, ω, p) = ∅ even if vp(N) = vd(N), as the following example shows.
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Example 5.3 Consider the semi-infinite LTP situation (N,A, ω, p), where N is a set of four players,
A =


−1 −4 −k2
−1 −1 · · · −1 · · ·
1 9/2 (k + 1)2/2

 , p =


1
1
2

 , and
ω(N) =


1
0
2

 .
Then
vd(N) = inf

(zM + p)Tω(N) + zTDβ(N)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
GT zM + zD ≥ A
T p,
zM ≥ 0, zD ≥ 0


= inf

zM,1 + 2zM,3 + 5+∞
∑
k∈D
zD,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k2zM,1 + zM,2 + zD,k
≥ 2k, k = 1, 2, . . . ,
zM ≥ 0, zD ≥ 0


= 5,
where FdN 6= ∅, but OdN = ∅ and this implies that Owen(A, ω, p) = ∅. There is no duality gap in
this example because vp(N) = 5 = vd(N). 3
In case of a duality gap, vp(N) < vd(N), another relation between the Owen set and the core
exists.
Theorem 5.4 Let (N,A, ω, p) be a semi-infinite LTP situation where vp(N) < vd(N) < ∞. Then
Owen(A, ω, p)∩ Core(A, ω, p) = ∅.
Proof. The proof of this theorem goes analogous to the proof of the first part in theorem 3.4. 2
Finally, we obtain the same result as for semi-infinite LP, namely, that if vp(N) is finite in a
semi-infinite LTP situation then the core is nonempty. For this, we need two intermediate theorems.
The first one is a theorem by Karlin and Studden (1966), which we translated to semi-infinite LTP
situations.
Theorem 5.5 Suppose that vp(N) is finite and that ωj(N) > 0 for all j ∈ M . Then there is no
duality gap, vp(N) = vd(N), and the dual programDN has an optimal solution.
The second intermediate theorem shows that we have no duality gap, vp(N) = vd(N), and
C(vp) 6= ∅ if certain conditions hold.
Theorem 5.6 If ω(N) ∈ IRM+ \ {0}, p ∈ IRM+ \ {0}, ωj(N) = 0⇒ gkj = 0 for all k ∈ D, pTak > 0
for all k ∈ D, ak /∈ IRM+ for all k ∈ D and vp(N) < ∞, then vp(N) = vd(N), OdN 6= ∅ and
C(vp) 6= ∅.
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Proof. Ifωj(N) > 0 for all j ∈M then together with vp(N) <∞ and theorem 5.5 it follows that there
is no duality gap and there exists an optimal dual solution zˆ. Define x ∈ IRN by xi = (zˆ + p)T ω(i)
for all i ∈ N . We leave it to the reader to show that x ∈ C(vp).
If we have ωj(N) = 0 for some j ∈ M then define M0 = {j ∈M | ωj(N) = 0} and M+ =
{j ∈M | ωj(N) > 0}. Then M0 6= ∅ and M+ 6= ∅. Now the primal problem can be rewritten to
vp(N) = p
Tω(N) + sup


∑
k∈D
pT akyk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈D g
k
j yk ≤ ωj(N), j ∈M+,
y ≥ 0


and similarly, we obtain for the dual problem
vd(N) = p
Tω(N) + inf


∑
j∈M+
zjωj(N)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈M+ g
k
j zj ≥ p
Tak, k ∈ D,
zj ≥ 0, j ∈M+


where we observe that the assumptions imply that for all k ∈ D there exists a j ∈ M+ such that
gkj > 0. Thus, the latter problem is feasible. Let ej denote the jth unit vector in IRM+ , with e
j
l = 1 if
l = j and ejl = 0 otherwise. Define the first moment cone K1 by
K1 = cone
(({
gkj
}
j∈M+
)
k∈D
,
(
ej
)
j∈M+
)
= IRM++
where the last equality follows from gkj ≥ 0 for all j ∈M+, k ∈ D. But then
{ωj(N)}j∈M+ ∈ int (K1) = IR
M+
++ ,
where int (K1) denotes the interior of the cone K1, because ωj(N) > 0 for all j ∈ M+. Together
with vp(N) < ∞ and theorem 5.5 it follows once again that vp(N) = vd(N) and there exists an
optimal dual solution zˆ. To obtain an element of the core C(v), we define zj = zˆj for all j ∈ M+
and zj = 0 otherwise. Also, define x ∈ IRN by xi = (z + p)T ω(i) for all i ∈ N . First,∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
(z + p)T ω(i) = (z + p)T ω(N)
=
∑
j∈M+
zˆjωj(N) + p
Tω(N) = vd(N) = vp(N).
Second, letS ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, be a coalition of players. Notice thatωj(N) = 0 for some j ∈M0 implies
that ωj(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N because ω(S) =
∑
i∈S ω(i). Then,
(z + p)T ω(S)
= pTω(S) +
∑
j∈M+
zˆjωj(S)
≥ pTω(S) + inf


∑
j∈M+
zjωj(S)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈M+ g
k
j zj ≥ p
Tak, k ∈ D,
zj ≥ 0, j ∈M+


= pTω(S) + sup


∑
k∈D
pTakyk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈D g
k
j yk ≤ ωj(S), j ∈M+,
y ≥ 0


≥ pTω(S) + sup
{
pTAy |Gy ≤ ω(S); yk = 0 if k /∈ D(S); y ≥ 0
}
= vp(S).
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We conclude that
∑
i∈S xi = (z + p)
T ω(S) ≥ vp(S) and hence, x ∈ C(vp). 2
With the help of these two theorems we prove our main result about semi-infinite LTP situations,
which states that if there exists a finite upper bound for the maximal profit that all producers together
can obtain then the core of the LTP game is nonempty.
Theorem 5.7 Let (N,A, ω, p) be a semi-infinite LTP situation and let (N, vp) be the corresponding
LTP game with vp(N) <∞. Then C(vp) 6= ∅.
Proof. In this proof, we consider one-by-one all the possible semi-infinite LTP situations that we may
come across. In each of these situations we show that either vp(N) =∞ or C(vp) 6= ∅.
First, suppose that ω(N) = 0. This implies that ω(S) = 0 for all coalitions S. No coalition
of producers can transform any goods or sell any on the market. Hence, vp(S) = 0 for all S and
C(vp) = {(0, . . . , 0)}.
Second, consider the situation where ω(N) 6= 0 but every transformation technique k needs a
good j for which ωj(N) = 0. Let h(t) describe for all bundles of goods t ∈ IRM+ those goods
that are available in a positive quantity, so, h(t) = {j ∈M | tj > 0}. Then h(ω(N)) 6⊃ h(gk) for
all k ∈ D means that each technique k needs some unavailable goods. Consequently, no coalition
S can transform any goods. The only thing it can do is sell its goods at the market and obtain
vp(S) = p
Tω(S). From ω(S) =
∑
i∈S ω(i) we derive that the core consists of a single element,
C(vp) = {(pTω(1), . . . , pTω(n))}, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Assume now that ω(N) 6= 0 and that some transformation techniques can be used because they
only need goods that are available, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for some k ∈ D. All the coalitions of
producers want to maximize their profit and therefore they will restrict their transformation to those
techniques that can be used. Therefore, without changing the values of the coalitions we remove all
the transformation techniques k for which h(ω(N)) 6⊃ h(gk). If this removal implies that D(S) = ∅
for some coalition S then define vp(U) = pTω(U) for all U ⊂ S. For convenience, let (N,A, ω, p)
also denote this reduced semi-infinite LTP situation.
This leads us to the next situation where ω(N) 6= 0, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for all k ∈ D, and also
p = 0. If all the goods have a price of zero then vp(S) = 0 for all coalitions S and consequently,
C(vp) = {(0, . . . , 0)}.
If ω(N) 6= 0, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for all k ∈ D, p 6= 0 and pT ak ≤ 0 for all k ∈ D then
no transformation technique gives a positive profit. For all optimal solutions y ∈ OpS it holds
that pTakyk = 0 for all techniques k. Hence, vp(S) = pTω(S) for all coalitions S and C(vp) =
{(pTω(1), . . . , pTω(n))}.
Now assume that ω(N) 6= 0, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for all k ∈ D, p 6= 0 and pT ak > 0 for some
k ∈ D. In the previous situation we have seen that if pT ak ≤ 0 then in the optimum pT akyk = 0.
This technique k will not have any influence on the profit and so, removal of these techniques will not
change the values of the coalitions. Also in this case, we define vp(U) = pTω(U) for all U ⊂ S if
the removal implies that D(S) = ∅.
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In the next situation, we consider ω(N) 6= 0, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for all k ∈ D, p 6= 0, pTak > 0
for all k ∈ D and ak ∈ IRM+ for some k ∈ D. Notice that for this technique k we have ak ∈ IRM+ \{0},
because ak = 0 implies pTak = 0, which is in contradiction to pT ak > 0. If ak ∈ IRM+ then gk = 0,
which means that techniquek needs no input goods to generate the positive profit pT ak. Consequently,
the coalition N of all players will set the activity level yk to infinity and so, vp(N) = ∞. The total
profit is infinitely large. We may say that we are in heaven because all the producers can take as much
of the profit as they want.
Finally, we consider ω(N) 6= 0, h(ω(N)) ⊃ h(gk) for all k ∈ D, p 6= 0, pT ak > 0 for all k ∈ D
and ak /∈ IRM+ for all k ∈ D. Notice that pT ak > 0 implies that ak /∈ IRM− for all k ∈ D. Together
with ak /∈ IRM+ we get that each vector ak contains at least one positive and one negative element.
Each transformation technique needs at least one input good to produce at least one output good. Now,
two situations may occur. Either we have vp(N) = vd(N) =∞, heaven once again, or vp(N) <∞.
In the latter case, theorem 5.6 shows that the core is a nonempty set. 2
6 Conclusions
We studied the Owen set, the core and relations between these two sets of two types of semi-infinite
situations. These are situations involving linear production (LP) and those involving the linear
transformation of products (LTP). We showed that if the underlying primal and dual problems of the
grand coalition of players have the same value, that is, there is no duality gap, then the Owen set is a
(possibly empty) subset of the core. Otherwise, the Owen set and the core have nothing in common.
In the case of LTP situations we had to exclude situations where the underlying dual problem takes
the value infinite. Finally, we showed that if there exists a finite upper bound of the maximal profit
then the core is a nonempty set.
After completing this study, some questions remain. Throughout the paper we use cones consisting
of real numbers like IRN and IRM+ . What would happen if we replace these cones by more general
cones? How do the results change if we consider an infinite number of producers (implying an infinite
number of production techniques)? And finally, what happens if we assume that the set of production
techniques is no longer countable? We intend to study these questions in the near future.
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